Ofcourse, Hegel pointed out the contradictory form ofthis reasoning. Humans lay claim to the possibility of absolute negation. Can you say no? No to everything? No to life? Yes, I can do that. From then on, freedom becomes tied to the possibility ofsaying yes to no. Abso­ lute negation is thus affirmative in principle. This claim then prompts Hegel to show that all possibility tends towards effectiveness, that all negation is confounded with the energy of its doubling, in other words, its posi­ tive power, its power ofaffirmation. Henceforth, ifsaying no always amounts to positing the possibility of something it is no longer possible simply to negate. Categori­ cal refusal is not possible.
Does negation have any chance at all then? The pos­ sibility I am trying to bring to light—how to say no, a cut and dry no, an inconvertible, irredeemable no; how to think destruction without remission—could be called the negativepossibility. This type ofpossibility is not the nega­ tion ofpossibility, nor is it to be confused with the impos­ sible. Without reducing it to affirmation, the negative possibility is not the expression ofany lack or any deficit. It bears witness to a power or aptitude of the negative that is neither affirmed nor lacking, a power that forms. As I indicated, to take on the search for such a possibility immediately situates the proposal both within and without the yes and the no, even within and without the positive and the negative as traditionally understood.

From Cathrine Malabou,The Ontology of t…